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THE GENERAL TREATY FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR; 
ITS GENESIS AND PERCEIVED EFFECTS 
UP TO 1 SEPTEMBER 1939 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper sets out to examine the circumstances which gave 
rise to the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed 
at Paris in 1928 (referred to hereafter as "The Pact of Paris" 
or "the Treaty"). It will look at the terms of the Pact of 
Paris itselfi and consider some of the effects of the Pact on 
International Institutions. 
The Pact of Paris is a remarkably brief document* containing a 
short preamble and two clauses. By those clauses* 63 States 
renounced the use of war as an instrument of national policy 
but retained their right to wage wars of self-defence. 
This paper will focus on one relatively narrow issue raised by 
the Pact* namely: What effect* if any* in international law 
did the Pact of Paris have on the concept of a just* as 
opposed to an injust* war. 
It will examine views expressed by some lawyers* politicians* 
diplomats* historians and authors of the effect of the Pact of 
Paris on the obligations owed to the international community 
by the adhering States. 
The paper will chiefly concern itself with commentators' views 
of the lawfulness or otherwise of aggressive wars in the 
period from the end of World War I to 1 September 1939* when 
World War II effectively commenced with the invasion of Poland 
by Germany. 
After World War II the International Military Tribunal met at 
Nuremburg and tried several former high ranking people in the 
National Socialist Government of Germany. That Tribunal 
handed down an historic and far-reaching decision which has 
had an important effect upon the way in which history has 
treated the Pact of Paris. The principles enunciated at 
Nuremburg additionally had an effect upon the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East which sat in Tokyo* Japan* 
and continued for some two years after the Nuremburg trials 
had been completed. 
This paper will examine and* if possible* attempt to identify 
the relevant International Law rules generally accepted by 
civilized nations as the appropriate law on aggressive wars as 
at I September 1939. Space does not permit treatment of the 
Si no-Japanese dispute concerning Manchuria nor will reference 
be made to any of the large volume of written commentary on 
the Pact of Paris which appeared after the commencement of 
World War II. 
International attempts to cope with* or minimize* aggressive 
war will be reviewed* including the Covenants of the League of 
Nations and the English and American peace movements. In 
addition* the European Pacts of Geneva and Locarno and the 
Habana Conference will be examined. 
The League of Nations proposals which* together with the 
Kel1ogg-Briand proposals* formed the basis for the Pact of 
Paris* will then be discussed, followed by an examination of 
the comments and reservations of the States involved in the 
Treaty. 
There will then be an analysis of the Pact itself and of its 
Implications for the International law rules relating to war. 
Finally, a conclusion Is expressed as to the perceived effect 
of the Pact of Paris on the legality of waging aggressive wars 
as at the outbreak of World War II. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR 
At the close of World War I the victorious allies established 
a commission^to enquire into and give its opinion on: 
(a) the responsibility of the authors of that war; and 
(b) the enforcement of appropriate penalties. 
In its report presented in March 1919, the Commission found 
that there had been violations of the laws and customs of war. 
1 .1 Majority Opinion 
The majority^of the Commission formed the view that there was 
in existence a set of established laws and customs of war, 
presumably before the war commenced, but certainly before it 
finished by asserting that any person regardless of the rank 
he held, be it however exalted, could be held responsible for 
any breach of the laws and customs of war and be liable to 
criminal prosecution before a properly constituted tribunal. 
Their denunciation was based upon the somewhat blurred concept 
of "the elementary laws of humanity", whatever that phrase 
might mean. 
They r e j e c t e d a r g u m e n t s b a s e d upon t h e s o v e r e i g n immuni ty of 
h e a d s of s t a t e and s a i d t h a t w h i l s t such a d o c t r i n e m i g h t be 
of p r a c t i c a l u s e i n d o m e s t i c l a w , i t was n o t i n any way 
f u n d a m e n t a l i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w . 
1. Conprising: Robert lansing, James Brown Scott (IMted States of America); Ernest M. Pbllock 
W.F. f^essey (British Biqjire); A. Tardieu, F. lamaude (France); V. Scialoja, M. D'Amelio (Italy); 
M. Adatchi, S. Tachi (Japan); Rolin-Jaequerayns (Belgium); N. Pblitis (Greece); L. Lubienski 
(Poland); S. Rosental (Roumania) and Slobodan Yovanovitch (Serbia) 
2. Comprising: British Bq)ire, France, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Rouiania and Serbia 
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They concluded that the Kaiser and others in positions of 
authority could have ameliorated the treatment afforded the 
allies and their friends by members of the German and 
associated armed forces. 
They recommended that a tribunal be established to determine 
what offences ought to be the subject of prosecution and how 
such prosecutions ought to proceed. In addition, they 
recommended that the Treaty of Peace should include provisions 
requiring the governments of the former enemy States to 
recognise the jurisdiction of the proposed high tribunal and 
the various national tribunals to try persons alleged to have 
committed offences against the laws and customs of war and the 
laws of humanity.^ 
1 .2 Minority Opinions 
1.2.1 Reservations by the Representatives of the United 
States 
The United States Representatives drew an important 
distinction between what they called "legal offences" and 
"moral offences". In their view, legal offences were matters 
in respect of which an accused could be made liable to trial 
and punishment before an appropriate tribunal but "moral 
offences" however evil or infamous or widespread their results 
might be, were beyond were beyond the reach of legal process 
and were therefore subject only to the moral sanction of 
public opinion.-' 
In their view, the Head of State, by whatever name he was 
called, was in fact responsible for breaches of the law, but 
he was responsible only in a political way to his own 
3. Violation of the Laws and Customs of War (1919) 19 
4. Id. 25 
5. Id. 59 
political constituency. 
They opposed the concept of negative criminality,which was 
espoused by the majority, and said that in order for an 
individual to be punished it must be established that the 
accused had actual knowledge, that the acts committed were 
criminal in nature; and that they possessed the power and 
authority required to prevent those events from occurring. 
Neither knowledge by the accused of commission of the offences 
nor ability to prevent their commission alone is sufficient. 
There must be a duty or obligation to act. Both knowledge and 
duty must exist in conjunction. In their view, a standard of 
liability which does not include both was to be rejected. 
The law and procedure to be applied in respect of such a trial 
would be the military law of the country against whom the 
offence was committed or, if more than one country's subjects 
were involved, then a tribunal might be formed by an 
assembling of members from the countries affected who would 
bring with them both the law to be applied and the procedure 
to be followed. They did not explain how any differences in 
law or procedure which may arise could be resolved, nor did 
they deal with the issue of whether the knowledge must be not 
only knowledge of the act complained of but also knowledge 
that the act itself was wrong in or contrary to law. 
They believed that the conference exceeded its mandate in 
embarking on an examination of alleged violations of the laws 
of humanity, because the Commission was established to seek 
facts which were within the ambit of violations of the laws 
and customs of war. 
6. Id. p.73 
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The United States refused to take any part in the proposed 
proceedings and declined to be represented on the proposed 
prosecuting commission because of uncertainty as to the law to 
be applied and as to the identity of the laws and principles 
of humanity. In addition, it objected to the extent of the 
jurisdiction of the proposed tribunal, 
1.2.2 Reservations by the Japanese delegation 
The Japanese representatives were concerned about the validity 
of two principles: 
1. Whether a tribunal constituted only by belligerents 
could, after winning a war,fairly put upon his trial an 
accused, formerly an enemy, and then proceed to try him 
for violation of the laws and customs of war. 
2. Whether there existed in international law any criminal 
law which might be applicable to the alleged offenders. 
1.3 Effects of the Versailles Peace Conference 
The recommendations made by the majority of the victorious 
allies were not put into effect. No international tribunal was 
established. Attempts made to extradite and try the former 
Kaiser were unsuccessful. Although individual war crimes 
proceedings were undertaken and some prosecutions were 
successful, there was to be no attempt to try Heads of State 
or Heads of Government for alleged breaches of the laws of 
humanity, whatever those laws may have been. 
7. Id. p. 79 
CHAPTER 2 
INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS TO COPE WITH THE 
CONCEPT OF AGGRESSIVE WAR 1919-1927 
2^ Covenant of the League of Nations 
During the drafting process which gave rise to the Covenant of 
the League of Nations detailed steps were taken to deal with 
the concept of aggressive war. The Covenant Itself recited* 
inter alia* that the signatory States* 
"in order to promote international co-operation and to 
achieve International peace and security by the 
acceptance of obligations not to resort to war ... [and] 
by the firm establishment of the understandings of 
International law as the actual rule of conduct among 
governments" 
accepted the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
For the purpose of this dissertation* only a small number of 
the Articles of the Covenant need be considered. 
The Covenant* In part* provided for: 
(a) an equality of voting amongst the members of the League; 
(b) unanimity In matters of substance; 
(c) members to undertake to "respect and preserve as against 
external aggression the territory* integrity and 
existing political independence of all members of the 
League.";1 
1, The Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 10 
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(d) what steps were to be taken in the event of war or 
threat of war; 
(e) the resolution of disputes by arbitration or inquiry by 
the Counci 1 ; 
(f) agreement that States would not resort to war until 
three months had elapsed after an arbitration award had 
been made* or the Council had made a report. 
The Covenant was subsequently amended to add provision for the 
Permanent Court of International Justice to effect a "judicial 
settlement" or to give a "judicial decision". 
By Article 16 the Council provided that if any member of the 
League resorted to war in breach of its obligations under 
Articles 12* 13 and 15* it was to be deemed to have committed 
an act of war against all other members of the League. 
International law recognised the existence of the institution 
of war and had attempted to ameliorate some of its harsh 
effects. As a result of that recognition it was seemingly an 
impossible task to expect the nations emerging from the Great 
War to create a League able to abolish war. Nonetheless* to 
that task the nations in 1919 addressed themselves. 
The unanimity requirement and its application to parties 
between whom hostilities had broken out was Itself the subject 
of dispute. The Council's actions in pursuance of the 
covenant had to be unanimous. The question arose: How was 
such unanimity to be reached when one or more of the parties 
to the dispute might well be voting members and therefore be 
able to prevent the Council from deciding in such a way as to 
be adverse to their own Interests. 
The French, presciently, took an opposite position and 
11 
asserted that a party interested in the outcome should not be 
permitted to obstruct a unanimous vote,as such a procedure 
could mean exposing the Council itself to a serious 
2 
possibility of impotency. 
Arguments about the unanimity requirement were to bedevil the 
development of the League's activities. The problem lessened 
after the acceptance by states that matters of procedure were 
not to be subject to the unanimity rule. Such a difference in 
view became of significant importance in the debates in the 
Assembly and the Council over Manchuria in the early 1930s. 
Doctor Wehberg, Professor of International Law at Geneva, 
argued that the Covenant of the League of Nations was 
dominated by the principle that war between the members of the 
League should not be regarded as prohibited^as the Covenant 
merely distinguished between permissible wars and prohibited 
wars . -^  
Further, he argued that the Covenant and therefore 
International Law expressly recognised the exclusive 
competency of a state to determine which matters are within 
its domestic jurisdiction. 
Each dispute not resolved by arbitration was to be submitted 
under Article 12 to the Council for examination. This 
provision could only have been carried out if the Council was 
able to draw up a report which attracted the judicial 
consequences foreshadowed in Article 15. Dr Wehberg conceded 
that it might be acceptable that war could be declared 
impossible in such a case,although it must be admitted that 
the then prevailing opinion supported the theory that war was 
both possible and not necessarily in breach of the terms of 
2. H. Wehberg. The Outlawry of War. (1931) 57 
3. Id. 9 
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the Covenant. 
He found it difficult to establish a distinction between wars 
of defence and offensive wars and argued that theories 
permitting defensive wars must be examined carefully. The 
question as to whether a particular war is one of aggression 
or defence is a question to be decided in international law by 
the state which has recourse to arms in order to defend 
itself. 
Early in the League's existence there arose a question as to 
whether the Covenant required States to abstain from armed 
force or only to abstain from actual war (i.e. declared war as 
opposed to the use of force, short of amounting to a formal 
state of war) during the prescribed period of delay.'^  The 
question remained unanswered and,because the doubts persisted, 
it was argued that there existed in the League machinery a 
serious lacuna for the protection of peace. By way of 
example, Italy, in 1923, claimed that her act of bombardment 
of Corfu in September 1923 did not lead to war nor was it 
intended to do so and therefore it was not contrary to Article 
12. Acts of war in the form of the aggression undertaken by a 
superior power may fall within the prohibition in Article 12. 
The test whether aggression, in law, amounted to war was to be 
resolved by looking at the formal attitude of the States 
involved. If the attacked state wished to treat the force 
being used as something falling short of actual war for 
whatever reason, then a formal state of war had not come into 
being. 
Arguably, the Covenant of the League had the effect of raising 
the standards of international law, in its attempt to offer an 
4. J.L. Brierly, International Law and Resort to Armed Force, (Vol. 4, 
1930-32) 317 
5. Q. Wright, 'The Outlawry of War' (1925) 19 A.J.I.L. 87 
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effective alternative to war for securing redress for a 
legitimate grievance. However, 15 years after the Covenant 
came into force and 6 years after the Pact of Paris was 
signed, it was argued that the League had failed to provide 
either an effective alternative to war or the measures of 
force falling short of those which did amount to war." 
Professor Zimmern asserted that war was not merely an 
unacceptable concept which would be excised from the 
international system. As war had performed a necessary 
function in the past,it could only be eliminated in the future 
if an effective alternative procedure could be provided which 
would fulfil the same function. 
Wright took it for granted that war could be waged only under 
the conditions set out in the Covenant. Further, he believed 
that acts of reprisal could not be treated as acts of 
hostility sufficient to allow the States against which they 
have been directed,immediately to claim full rights of war. A 
contrary argument was advanced by De Visscher who wrote that 
it would be absurd to argue that a state which declared war in 
response to armed reprisals, could be held to have acted in 
o 
breach of its obligations under the covenant." 
McNair submitted that a plaintiff State which undertook to use 
force by way of reprisal or intervention,did so at the risk of 
being in breach of the terms of the covenant if the other 
State affected elected to regard those measures as war. If 
that State were to elect to treat the measure as war, it 
cannot be said to have had resort to war. It would not be in 
9 
breach of the Covenant. 
6. A. Zijniiem. The l£agueof Nationsand the Rule of law 1918-1935 (1936) 418 
7. "Reprisals are such injurious and otherwise interpatiOTwl 1 yillegalacts of one state against 
another for the purposes of con5)elling the latter to oxisait to a satisfactory settlenent of a 
difference created by its own delinquency." L. Oppaiheiin, International law (4th ed. Vol. II 
1926) 84 
8. Q. Wright, 'When does Wbr EjcLst?' (1932) 26 A.J.I.L. 365 
9. Id. 367 
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As Article 16(4) made provision for a violator of the Covenant 
to be expelled from the League by a vote of "all the other 
members of the League represented", measures dealing with 
economic boycott and wars of execution were not,of themselves, 
punishments: they were intended to ensure an aggressor's 
punishment. If exclusion from the League itself constituted a 
punishment, Dr Wehberg argued, the gravest objection would be 
raised, as the sanctions which were intended to punish the 
aggressor may allow the conclusion to be drawn that the 
Covenant made a crime of a proscribed war of aggression. ^•I-
2.2 Lord Cecil and The Outlawry of Aggressive War 
Lord Robert Cecil, an important and influential figure in the 
League of Nations' Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments, 
developed and presented a draft of a treaty for mutual 
assistance, which enunciated for the first time the proposal 
for the outlawing of all aggressive war. Initially, he was 
looking for a strengthening of the right of sanction. He 
sought to bring into existence a convention in which all 
interested States would offer quick and effective aid in the 
event of aggressive war. The proposed Treaty was to be 
supplemented by special guarantee pacts and it allowed for 
military support to be provided for a war which was a war of 
12 
aggression not expressly forbidden by the Covenant. The sub-
committee which met in London in May 1923 proposed a guarantee 
pact with a preamble reading: "The high contracting parties 
resolve to abstain from all aggression against each other ..." 
The Mixed Commission's plenary assembly shared that view but 
sought to take it further by introducing it in the draft 
10. H. Wehberg, The Outlawry of War. (1931) 11 
11. Id. 12 
12. Id. 15 
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Treaty itself in the following form: 
"The high contracting parties, affirming that aggressive 
war is international crime, undertake the solemn 
engagement not to make themselves guilty of this crime 
against any other nation." 
The Polish and French delegates supported the proposal. The 
French delegate, Jouhoux, said that the obligation ought to be 
incorporated in a special article of the Treaty. In his view 
the moral influence of such a treaty was important as it could 
have an impact upon the opinion of the world. 
The Japanese representative, Sugimura, enquired as to whether 
the phrase "aggressive war" was to include the possibility of 
war permitted by Article 15(7) of the Covenant. Lord Cecil 
said that it was the object of the Treaty to protect the 
States against every type of aggressive war.^ -^  
At the same time, a committee of jurists formed by the Council 
of the League of Nations formulated a proposal to "denounce as 
a crime and to declare as prohibited only a war of aggression 
undertaken in violation of the Covenant." 
The meetings of the fourth Assembly of the League of Nations 
accepted that a war would not amount to a war of aggression 
if: 
(i) there had been a unanimous decision made by the 
Council or by an arbitral tribunal; 
(ii) the war was waged by a party who had accepted and 
acted on such a decision or judgment; 
(ill) the war was waged against a state which did not 
accept the decision or judgment. 
13. Id. 16 
14. Ibid. 
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2.3 The American Movement 
The American writer, Levinson, proposed that aggressive war 
ought to be abolished. This notion was the subject of 
immediate attack on the grounds that,if war was to be outlawed, 
there ought to be no distinction drawn between defensive and 
offensive wars. The American movement argued that the right 
to self-defence was implied, but that in the process of 
defending oneself, that action itself could be tantamount to 
waging war. The movement discarded distinctions between 
permissible and prohibited wars. They argued that wars of 
aggression did not exist in the strict sense of the term and, 
even if they did, the identity of the aggressor could never 
be established with any degree of certainty.^-' 
Nations in general are unlikely to concede that they are 
waging a war of aggression. It is more likely that they will 
assert that they are taking up arms for their own defence. 
Dr. Wehberg argued that there could only be defensive war when 
there had been an attack. There should then be some method of 
determining who the aggressor is, and if that could be done 
with any certainty,it is possible to determine a case of true 
defence. 
The Outlawry of War movement gathered pace when, on November 
12, 1921, President Harding declared that not only the United 
States but all other nations having a proper sense of their 
-I f. 
responsibility wished to see war outlawed. President 
Coolidge, on December 3, 1924, said of such proposals that 
while they can be viewed with sympathy, the United States must 
safeguard its liberty to deal with what it perceived as being 
its own domestic policies. 
15. Idl- 20 
16. Id.. 19 
17. Ibid. 
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Senator Borah's proposal in the U.S. Senate of 13 February 
1923 would have seen the development of a very high standard 
of State responsibility under international law for acts which 
take place under the authority of a state whether within or 
without its territory. If adopted and implemented. States 
would have been obliged, in some unspecified way, to prevent 
their Governments from committing any violations of 
international law. They would be required to enact criminal laws 
for the prevention, within their territory, of offences 
against international law by individuals. His proposal would 
have provided that the absence of such legislation would not 
be a defence in law against an international complaint.^^ The 
proposal was not adopted by the U.S. Senate and can only be 
seen as evidence of an ideal espoused by some individual U.S. 
Senators. 
At the same time, the European position was that the outlawry 
of war by international law could only proceed if there was a 
parallel growth in some form of international organisation to 
provide the means of enforcing the proposed security 
arrangements. 
American attempts to establish tribunals to resolve 
international disputes met some success with the establishment 
of the Hague Tribunal and the establishment of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice. At the same time, the 
Americans took the view that their country was not to be bound 
by advisory opinions of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice which were rendered by the court on questions not 
voluntarily submitted to it by the United States. Thus the 
American movement was being arguably inconsistent in asserting 
18. Q. Wright 'The Outlawry of War', (1925) 19 A.J.I.L. 81 
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that tribunals and law could take the place of war in the 
resolution of international conflict. Nonetheless, the United 
States supported attempts which were then being made towards 
19 
the codification of international law. 
2 .4 The Geneva Protocol 
The concept of the outlawry of war, although mentioned by Lord 
Cecil and discussed in the United States before the end of 
1923, was not a phrase with which Western Europe was familiar. 
The Geneva Protocol itself owes something to the drafting 
skills of a group of Americans, including Professor Shotwell. 
In 1924 a New York Committee prepared a draft Treaty of 
Disarmament and Security seeking the codification of the law 
relating to aggression. This concept found its way in part 
20 into the Geneva Protocol. 
On October 21, 1924 the Protocol, formally known as the 
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 
was signed by 19 States. It was an attempt to strengthen the 
framework of the League of Nations. 
The preamble to the Protocol asserted that a war of aggression 
was "an international crime".^ -'- In addition, the Protocol was 
made pursuant to Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations in that it was a measure aimed at the reduction of 
national armaments. By the Protocol, the signatory States 
undertook that as between each other the provisions of the 
Protocol would become binding. By Article 2 the signatory 
States agreed that they would not resort to war against a 
state which accepted all the obligations set out in the 
Treaty, "except in cases of resistance to acts of aggression 
19. C. Coolidge 'Annual Message to Congress' (1925) 1 A.J.I.L. 168 
20. Q. Wright, 'The Outlawry of War' (1925) 19 A.J.I.L. 102 
21. protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes' 
19 
or acting in agreement with the Council or the Assembly of the 
League of Nations in accordance with the provisions of the 
22 Covenant and of the present Protocol." 
The signatory States recognized as compulsory the jurisdiction 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
It was prepared and adopted by the Fifth Assembly of the 
League. It was never ratified and did not come into effect, 
as Article 21(xxi) provided that the Protocol would be null 
and void unless the proposed disarmament conference adopted a 
plan for the reduction of armaments. This condition 
23 
subsequent did not eventuate. 
International arbitration, which had a reputable international 
image, was regarded by some politicians and statesmen as a 
useful tool. Prime Minister MacDonald of the United Kingdom, 
on September 4 1924, noted that arbitration could be used as a 
test for identifying an aggressor by asking him to accept 
arbitration. If the alleged aggressor declined to accept 
arbitration, then that refusal could be used by the 
International community as indicating where the real 
responsibility for the aggression lay. 
Premier Herriot of France agreed, and said that the aggressor 
would be the party who, in future, refused to submit to 
• 24 arbitration. 
Dr. Morrison was critical of the Protocol. He would not 
concede that aggressive war, as a valid concept, existed, but 
if it did it could not be outlawed. In the absence of some 
satisfactory mechanism whereby the aggressor could be 
identified, he thought the concept was useless. He noted the 
definition of aggressor as enunciated by MacDonald and Herriot 
22. Id.. 22 
23. F.H. Hartmann, Basic Documents of International Relations, (1951) 99 
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but said that although the concept seemed reasonable in the 
abstract, its advocates were saying that if war broke out the 
League was to order both parties to stop fighting, to retire 
behind their former frontiers, and then submit the dispute to 
peaceful settlement. Such attempts, he thought, were mere 
"trifles with the grave issues of peace and war. To imagine 
that two nations with their fighting blood heated with the 
temperature of actual combat would heed the 'order' of the 
League and submissively retire behind their lines while the 
question of their respective guilt of aggression was being 
25 determined is ... boyish thinking." 
In his view, the so-called outlawing of aggressive war could 
only be accomplished by means of military sanctions. As long 
as the system of war remains as an institution, undisturbed or 
unchallenged, any promise which a state may make not to 
"engage in a particular kind of war aggressive or non-
permissible or unrighteous or any other kind, is worth just as 
much as the paper it is written on. In order to invest such 
promises with even the illusion of reality and validity, it is 
necessary that they be backed up with military sanctions. But 
the execution of military sanctions is aggressive war itself 
in its most flagrant and indisputable form! Such an 
aggressive war against an alleged or convicted aggressor would 
be waged by the League, the presumptive guardian of peace, and 
under the authority of law; yet the procedure is called the 
'outlawry of aggressive war.'"2" In his view attempts to 
outlaw aggressive war were, no matter how well intentioned, 
nothing more than an illusion. 
However, as the Protocol failed to compel the arbitration of 
25. C.C. Morrison, The Outlawry of War. (1927) 219 
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all disputes, guarantees of compliance with arbitrated 
decisions were otiose. 
The Protocol would have filled in some of the gaps in the 
Covenant of the League and provided for the parties thereto a 
logically complete system of collective security. It was not 
to be given the opportunity so to do because of the 
unwillingness of many of the League States to remove some of 
27 the flaws in the Covenant. 
As the delegate from Greece wryly observed, "When arbitration 
is optional, guarantees are useless; but when arbitrations 
28 
are compulsory they are indispensable." 
The British Government, taking a different view of the 
adequacy of the Covenant, advised the League Council on March 
12, 1925 that it would not accept the Protocol. The grounds it 
gave were that it could not conceive that international 
differences might take a form for which the peace preserving 
29 
machinery in the Covenant provided no specific remedy. 
2.5 The Pact of Locarno 
This Pact, signed by Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain 
and Italy on 16 October 1925 came into effect September 14, 
1926. It was adopted as a means of ensuring regional 
security. By the Pact, the Franco-Belgium-German frontier was 
declared inviolate. Great Britain and Italy gave guarantees 
of their assistance to any of the other parties attacked 
across the defined frontier. The Pact set out to supplement 
the Covenant of the League of Nations, guaranteeing the 
territorial and security integrity of each member of the 
League by pledging automatic sanctions against any designated 
27. F.H. Hartmann, Basic Documents of International Relations, (1951), 98 
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aggressor. 
The Locarno Pact was an attempt to resolve the uncertainty 
surrounding the application of sanctions by the League of 
Nations in the case of aggression. The Pact was limited 
strictly to Germany's western frontier,and since this accorded 
with the British policy of ensuring the stability of the 
lowlands area of Europe, it attracted British support. The 
Pact was unique in that the guaranteeing powers promised to 
aid Germany or France, depending upon which country was 
attacked. 
The origins of the Locarno Pact are to be found in the 
discussions which took place at Versailles after the Great War 
when France tried to secure her borders against attack from 
Germany per medium of a defensive treaty with Great Br it ain .-'•'^  
The Pact permitted the waging of defensive war only after 
approval had been given by the Governing Council. 
Belgium, Germany and France, by accepting the Pact of Locarno, 
acknowledged that the idea of the outlawing of aggressive war 
was no longer something which could only be achieved in 
Utopia. The Pact of Locarno was hailed in the United States 
as "a positive victory of that peace movement which parallels 
the efforts of the League of Nations. "-^ ^ 
The Locarno Pact was seen as an important step towards a world 
which could undertake the process of disarmament. It was 
argued that the abolition of aggressive war and the security 
of nations could be affected by the formulation and acceptance 
of a code of international law. Such a code would define the 
rights and duties of states and establish a court to which 
applications could be made concerning breaches of its 
30. F.H. Hartmann, Basic Documents of International Relations (1951) 111 
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prov isions. 
Dr. Morrison, long a trenchant critic of the efficacy of 
international treaties, felt that the Locarno Treaties 
"contain[ed] not a single essential principle or commitment 
which was not already incorporated in the Covenant of the 
33 
League of Nations." He conceded that the Pact was justly 
regarded as a symbol important to the peace of Europe; but 
wryly noted that it required another Pact to prevent a 
recurrence of a war between France and Germany, thus 
highlighting the inadequacy of the Covenant of the League. 
2.6 The Habana Conference 1928 
The Fifth International Conference of American States at Rio 
de Janiero in 1927 resolved to have twelve projects of public 
international law drafted for submission to the next 
conference. The Sixth Conference was held at Habana in Cuba. 
The Mexican delegation submitted a resolution which was 
subsequently adopted by the plenary session of the Conference. 
That resolution read in part: 
"There is no international controversy, however serious 
it may be, which cannot be peacefully arranged if the 
parties desire in reality to arrive at a pacific 
settlement; that war of aggression constitutes an 
international crime against the human species; resolves: 
1. All aggression is considered illicit and as such is 
declared prohibited ..." 
The Conference agreed that war should be condemned "as an 
instrument of national policy in [the] mutual relations' of 
the countries represented. They adopted compulsory 
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arbitration as the means to be employed for the pacific 
solution of the international differences of a juridical 
character. It agreed to hold a further meeting to flesh out 
the proposals. These proposals for the outlawry of war were 
being formulated contemporaneously with the exchange of the 
Kellogg-Briand notes. 
The basic premise of the drafts of the Sixth Pan-American 
Conference was that war was not to be accommodated in a system 
of international law, but could be entirely eliminated from 
it. If its resolution was to be accepted by all states,war 
would cease to have any place in international law. 
The resolution is, however, internally inconsistent. It 
commences by asserting that all international controversies 
are capable of peaceful solutions but only seeks to deal with 
wars of aggression. Again, it seems to be setting out a 
Utopian ideal rather than attempting to grapple with the real 
issues of the causes of war. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PROPOSALS BY THE ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE 
OF NATIONS, 1925-1927 
Prior to the conclusion of the Pact of Locarno,the Sixth 
Assembly, in 1925, also took up the question of the outlawry 
of war. The proposed resolution - "Proclaiming afresh that a 
war of aggression constitutes an international crime ..." -
was vigorously debated. 
The representative from Belgium, M. Rolin, conceded that prior 
Assemblies of the League of Nations had declared war to be an 
international crime. He said that if the Assembly conceived 
its role as limited to clarifying the existing law, it would 
be wrong "to maintain that every war of aggression is an 
2 
international crime." 
The Spanish Government took the position that offensive 
warfare was already an international crime and in this,the 
representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia concurred. 
During the plenary session Lord Cecil emphasized the great 
importance he attached to the formal denunciation of 
aggressive war. In his opinion, the former system of 
international law permitted resort to war as a right, and he 
urged the Assembly to reverse this position by designating 
aggressive war as an international crime. 
A contrary view was maintained by Dr Wehberg in his lectures 
1. Q. Wright, 'The Outlawry of War', (1925) 19 A.J.I.L. 41 
2. Ibid. 
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to the Academy of International Law at Hague in the late 
twenties. In his opinion,the Sixth Assembly's declaration 
against offensive warfare did not effect any change in 
international law: it merely expressed a wish to cure a 
perceived imperfection in the existing law. He wrote: 
"It establishes that according to the covenant of the 
League of Nations every offensive war is unfortunately 
not an international crime and that it is necessary to 
fill this gap. This intervention in favour of the 
improvement of existing law is no doubt equivalent to the 
f3 moral condemnation of all offensive warfare.' 
The Eighth Assembly commenced on 27 September 1927 and 
disarmament was its theme. When debate commenced, the general 
discussion again focused on arbitration and other means for 
maintaining peace. 
The German representatives identified the central importance 
of the resolution of disputes by pacific means: "War cannot 
be prevented by preparing for a war against war, but only by 
removing its causes." 
Eventually the Polish proposal was unanimously adopted after a 
roll call. It read: 
"The Assembly, recognising the solidarity which unites 
the community of nations; being inspired by a firm 
desire for the maintenance of general peace; being 
convinced that a war of aggression can never serve as a 
means of settling international disputes and is, in 
consequence, an international crime; considering that a 
solemn renunciation of all wars of aggression would tend 
to create an atmosphere of general confidence calculated 
3. H. Wehberg, The Outlawry of War. (1931) 42 
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to facilitate the progress of the work undertaken with a 
view to disarmament; declares: 
1. That all wars of aggression are, and shall always 
be, prohibited. 
2. That every pacific means must be employed to settle 
disputes of every description which may arise 
between states." 
Dr Wehberg found the resolution innocuous and superfluous 
since it restricted the outlawry of war to those wars already 
banned by the Covenant. In his view, only a resolution 
proscribing all offensive warfare would have been significant. 
Commenting on a comparison between the resolutions of the 
Sixth and Eighth Assemblies, he wrote: "The Sixth Assembly 
had declared the outlawry of war as desirable. It wished to 
transcend the Covenant. The Eighth Assembly contented itself 
with solemnly outlawing offensive wars already interdicted by 
the Covenant".^ 
The resolution was nothing more than a resolution of the 
Assembly itself and did not bind the governments whose 
representatives voted in favour of it. It was similar in 
effect to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and had no 
value "further than the moral effect of solemn expressions of 
the opinions of the body which [made it]". The resolution did 
represent an advance in the development of a new international 
custom. It was the first occasion on which such a large 
number of statesmen representing a cross-section of 
governments agreed that international differences of all 
characters ought to be resolved by peaceful means. However, 
for the declaration to be of any practical value, it is required 
5. J.W. Gamer, 'Arbitration&Outlawry of Vfer at the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations' 
(1928) 22 A.J.I.L. 133 
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to be followed by arrangements to implement it. As Dr Garner 
starkly put it: 
"Wars of aggression cannot be outlawed by mere resolution 
of assemblies any more than burglary in the community can 
be. Mobilisation of public sentiment against them is a 
necessary preliminary step in the process but agencies 
and institutions through which the force of public 
opinion can be given effect are equally necessary."^ 
Without the machinery being put in place for the process of 
arbitration to be undertaken, the declaration of the Eighth 
Assembly must remain simply as a pious wish. Garner further 
observed that there was no assurance that any governments 
whose representatives adopted the resolution would ratify it, 
or if they did, that they would agree on necessary machinery 
measures to enable the ideas to function in the real world. 
Resolutions, treaties and protocols such as those envisaged by 
the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Assemblies of the League of 
Nations have had little influence in the past in deterring 
parties from war when they thought it appropriate to go to 
war. As Wright wrote, such treaties tend to shade into "bi-
lateral treaties of guarantee and alliance which, in proportion, 
as they maintain peace between the parties tend to stimulate 
war with outside states. War cannot be made illegal except 
through general treaties establishing rules applicable to all 
states."^ 
8. J.W. Garner, 'Arbitration & Outlawry of War at the Eighth Assembly 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PROPOSALS 
Upon his assumption of the Carnegie and Down Professorship, 
Professor Shotwell delivered an inaugural lecture in which he 
put the thesis that as a result of the developments in the 
world economy, war was no longer a pertinent instrument in 
international policy. Shotwell became involved in a peace 
project whose intention was to proscribe attack and invasion 
as well as war. However, his scheme did allow three 
exceptions. Non-aggressive or defensive war was to be 
permitted but could only be resorted to if there had 
previously been an offer by the nation attacked to resolve the 
dispute in a pacific fashion. In addition, express 
reservations were made to enable America to retain its freedom 
under the Monroedoctrine on the American continent. This was 
subject to the proviso that America must have previously 
attempted to settle the dispute which led to the war by 
arbitration or mediation. A third exception provided for the 
application of sanctions against a treaty-breaking state, 
whilst allowing that the application of sanctions was to be 
without prejudice to the terms of the treaty. Thus, countries 
which had not broken the treaties would recover their freedom 
of action to wage war, as against the party which acted in 
violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
1. J.T. Shotwell, What Germany Forgot, (1940), 77 
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On April 6 1927, approaching the tenth anniversary of the 
U.S.'s entry into the Great War, the French Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briand, took up Shotwell's theme in 
an address to America urging its co-operation on outlawing war 
in Europe. His message, addressed significantly not to the 
government but to the people of the United States, was that 
France was prepared to enter into an agreement with the United 
States to outlaw war as between themselves. Briand's 
suggestions were taken up in the United States by Dr Butler, a 
prominent member of the burgeoning peace movement who, on 25 
April 1927, urged that the people of the United States should 
publicly announce that they would never use war as a means of 
enforcing their policies with respect to France. 
On June 20, 1927, the U.S. Ambassador in Paris handed to 
Briand a draft treaty in two articles,by which both States 
would formally condemn recourse to war and would agree to 
renounce war as an instrument of their national policy towards 
each other. The draft further provided for the settlement of 
all disputes that might arise between the two countries by 
peaceful means alone. 
The proposed Franco-American treaty, according to French 
opinion, ought not to contain anything which might be 
interpreted as indicating that an alliance was either 
contemplated or in existence as between the two countries. 
Briand's concept was that the proposed pact should be kept 
simple and should be confined to being a declaration of the 
two countries, that under no circumstances would they have 
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resort to war as between themselves. 
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Briand'8 proposal, which really amounted to a declaration of 
principle, received the enthusiastic support of Dr. Morrison. 
Writing in 1927, prior to the treaty becoming a reality, he 
was convinced that the cause of world peace would not be best 
served by the documentation of what he saw as being a friendly 
overture into the form of an elaborate treaty. He was opposed 
to a treaty which would contain detailed provisions relating 
to such matters as disarmanent, arbitration, conciliation and 
the codification of international law. In his view, if a pact 
was to emerge at all, it should be both brief and simple.^ 
Nonetheless, he noted that war, as an institution, would be 
unaffected by the proposed bi-lateral treaty, as it would in 
no way remove the entrenched position that war held in the 
international legal system. 
Dr Butler again rendered assistance by restating the 
principles of the proposal in simple terms: 
1. The renunciation of war as an instrument of national 
policy. 
2. The recognition of the legitimacy of national defence 
under definite and agreed conditions. 
3. The obligation to refrain from assisting a nation at war 
in violation of its pledge to use peaceful means of 
resolving its differences. 
The issue was taken up in the U.S. Senate. It was urged on 
the Senate by Senators Borah and Capper that the United States 
accept the proposal of France and that the United States 
accept, as a matter of policy, that it should enter into 
arrangements with France and other countries with similar 
outlooks to formally renounce war as an instrument of public 
5. C.C. Morrison, The Outlawry of War (1927), 292 
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policy. Both countries should agree to settle their 
international disputes only by mediation, arbitration or 
conciliation. 
Kellogg, the U.S. Secretary of State, wrote to Briand on 
December 28, 1927, proposing,that instead of seeking a simple 
bi-lateral arrangement, each country might make a more 
significant contribution to the cause of world peace by 
jointly seeking to obtain the agreement of the principal 
states to a declaration which would renounce war as an 
instrument of their national policy. 
Briand, on 5 January 1928, agreed to enlarge the proposal, but 
thought it more appropriate that before doing so France and 
the United States accept the draft proposal by affixing their 
signatures. 
Discussion between the governments took place as to what was 
meant by the phrase "war as an instrument of national policy" 
as opposed to the phrase "war of aggression". In Shotwell's 
view, both phrases meant the same thing in substance. 
The French were concerned that action by them in policing the 
Treaty of Locarno, for example, could bring it into conflict 
with the proposal to renounce war. The French linked the 
concept of police action and the renunciation of war together. 
This was not, as Shotwell put it, helpful to the American 
administration as the American Government's refusal to accept 
the role of an international policeman had been one of the 
chief obstacles to its acceptance of the Covenant. 
On 27 February 1928 Kellogg, repeating Senator Borah's 
arguments, said that if France was able to sign a bi-lateral 
treaty renouncing war as an instrument of national policy, it 
7. Id. 132 
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could also sign a multi-lateral treaty, as the difference 
between the two was merely one of degree and not one of 
substance. Kellogg referred to the resolution of the Sixth 
International Conference of American States at Habana and 
noted that seventeen of the twenty-one states who accepted the 
resolution were,themselves,members of the League of Nations. 
He wrote that any attempts to define an aggressor would weaken 
the positive value of the proposed pact and would effectively 
destroy it. In his letter to Briand he noted that governments 
should acknowledge that such attempts would not be successful 
and must ultimately impair, if not destroy, the true 
8 
significance of the proposals. 
Dr. Morrison wrote in similar terms during 1927. In his 
opinion, attempts at precise semantic analysis of the proposal 
might well imperil what he colourfully described as "the high 
adventure of two great peoples who are determined to trust 
each other to do justice without so much as a shadow of a 
9 
threat of force thrown between them". 
Had the proposal by Briand been expressed in a more detailed 
form, it is unlikely that it would have passed through the 
U.S. Senate, the majority of whom were either hostile, cynical 
10 
or indifferent. The proposal was so bland that it could be 
accepted on the one hand as not meaning very much at all, 
while at the same time those who were in favour of it could 
publicly espouse it as a proclamation of the outlawry of war. 
The latter naturally put all the emphasis on the first of 
its two short Articles which is bothapromise of good behaviour 
and self-denying ordinance of war renunciation. 
Dr Wehberg raised the question: whether it was right to forbid 
8. H. Wehberg, The Outlawry of War. (1931), 74 
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war as a means of national policy only. It was argued that 
the proposed formula could give rise to the interpretation 
that war shall be permitted under certain conditions, for 
example, as a means of 'international' policy, as a means of 
asserting religious dogma, a philosophy of life, or, for 
example, as a means of crushing the Soviet Union. Hence, it 
would be better, so it was argued, to renounce war in general 
and not merely as an instrument of national policy. 
On April 13, 1928, the Government of the United States sent 
identical notes to the Governments of France, Great Britain, 
Germany, Italy and Japan and other members of the League 
seeking two things: support for the general proposal of a 
treaty for the renunciation of war; and, secondly, the opinion 
of the recipient States as to whether the proposal conflicted 
with the duties imposed upon member states of the League of 
Nations. 
Criticisms of the proposal were levelled by the Governments of 
the United Kingdom and, in particular, Germany. Kellogg, in a 
note of 23 June 1928 dealt with five issues raised by proposed 
signatories. 
I. The right of self-defence was an inalienable right 
inherent in sovereign states. He wrote, "Every nation 
is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions 
to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it 
alone is competent to decide whether circumstances 
require recourse to war in self-defence ... Express 
recognition by a treaty of this inalienable right, 
however, gives rise to the same difficulty encountered 
in any effort to define aggression ... In as much as no 
II. H. Wehberg, The Outlawry of War. (1931), 76 
35 
treaty provision can add to the natural right of self-
defence, it is not in the interests of peace that a 
treaty should stipulate the juristic conception of self-
defence since it is far too easy for the unscrupulous to 
1 2 
mould events to accord with an agreed definition." 
2. The League Covenant, in his view, imposed no affirmative 
primary obligation to go to war. It may authorise war, 
but it was up to the individual members to decide 
whether the authorisation was legitimate and necessary. 
3. Whilst the Locarno Treaties may call for police action, 
that call could only be in respect of a country which 
had "resorted to war in violation of its solemn pledge 
14 thereunder." 
4. Treaties of neutrality were unaffected. 
5. As a matter of law, "violation of a multi-lateral anti-
war treaty to resort to war by one party thereto would 
automatically release the other parties from their 
obligation to the treaty-making state, and the express 
recognition of this principle of law is wholly 
unnece ssary." 
ame On 27 August 1928 a Pact was signed in Paris which bee 
known as "The Pact of Paris", "The Kellogg Briand Pact" or 
"The Treaty for the Renunciation of War". The Pact came into 
force on 24 July 1929, the date of the deposit of the Japanese 
-I £ 
ratification in Washington. 
On the occasion of signing the Treaty, Briand observed, "Peace 
has been proclaimed, and that is well, that is much. But 
peace is yet to be organized. For settlement by force, we 
must substitute settlement by law. That must be the work of 
12. D.P. Myers, Origin & Conclusion of the Paris Pact, (1929) 355 
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tomorrow. "•'•' 
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CHAPTER 5 
RENUNCIATION OF WAR TREATY 
COMMENTS AND RESERVATIONS BY STATES 
By a note of 19 May 1928,the British Foreign Minister informed 
the United States that: 
"There are certain regions of the world, the welfare and 
integrity of which constitute a special and vital 
interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's 
Government have been at pains to make it clear in the 
past that interference with these regions cannot be 
suffered. Their protection against attack is, to the 
British Empire, a measure of self-defence. It must be 
clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great 
Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct 
understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of 
action in this response." 
No record seems to exist of Kellogg's consideration of the 
British interpretation as reflected in the note of May 19, 
1928; nor does any reference to the British interpretation 
appear in the Diplomatic correspondence which took place prior 
to the Treaty being signed. 
In his note to Chamberlain of 23 June 1928, Kellogg set forth 
in detail his view of the force and effect of the Treaty. 
1. D.P. Myers, Origin & Conclusion of the Paris Pact. (1929), 344 
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From the language used by signatory powers, it may be inferred 
that they accepted and subscribed the treaty on the basis of 
Kellogg's interpretation and that Great Britain did so on the 
firm understanding that the anti-war treaty did not affect her 
vital interest in the area referred to in Mr Chamberlain's 
note of May 19. 
To some extent, the British reservation was comparable with 
the American M nroe doctrine reservation. Wehberg argues that 
the British reservation was much less definite than the 
American doctrine. In addition, unlike its American 
counterpart, it did not apply to a clearly defined 
geographical region. He thought it a dubious and 
imperialistic reservation which diminished considerably the 
2 
significance of the Treaty. 
The U.S.S.R. later lodged an objection on August 31, 1928, 
when the Treaty had been signed and the text accepted by the 
signatory States. The U.S.S.R., as an adhering State, had the 
opportunity to make a reservation which considered in 
interests, provided that the other powers accepted that 
reservation. A reservation in that form would have required 
to be declared formally, either prior to or at the time of 
adhesion. In its note, the U.S.S.R., after complaining of 
being left out of the initial drafting process, pointed out 
that it had already, long before the Pact of Paris had been 
thought of, signed Renunciations of War treaties with several 
states, including Germany. They complained of the inadequacy 
of definition in Article I, on their own behalf and on behalf 
of China. They were deeply troubled by the reservations that 
3 they perceived to have been imposed by Great Britain. It 
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complained of the absence of any linked disarmament programme 
and of the insufficiency and vagueness of the very wording of 
the prohibition of war. Technically, the process of adhesion, 
rather than "accession", deprived a state of the right of 
accepting the Pact subject to modification.^ The U.S.S.R.'s 
objection, according to Wehberg, can only be considered to 
have moral significance. Egypt, Turkey and Persia made 
similar declarations after the event. 
The United States Senate insisted that the Pact of Paris left 
the Monroe Doctrine intact. By implication, the U.S. Senate 
was reserving a right to the United States to use war as an 
instrument of national policy to the extent allowed under the 
Monroe Doctrine. Thus large areas of the world were, in one 
way or another, unaffected by the Pact. British policy, in 
various parts of the world, and the United States policy in 
central and southern America, were based upon the maintenance 
of the status quo, subject only to change brought about by 
peaceful means. 
The Japanese Government also sought to maintain such a right 
in respect of what it perceived as its interests in the Far 
East. In 1932,the Imperial Japanese Government advised the 
Assembly of the League of Nations that it claimed a right to a 
"Monroe" type doctrine by asserting that it was responsible 
for the maintenance of peace and order in the Far East. In an 
address to the Imperial Diet in Japan, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Count Uchida, noted that the Covenant 
recognised the validity of the Monroe Doctrine as a basis for 
regional undertakings (through Article 21), and said that any 
plan involving the construction of an edifice of peace in the 
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Far East would only be effective if it based itself upon, and 
recognised, the power and influence of Japan.8 The Japanese 
claim was not acceded to by other members of the League. 
In his address to the United States Senate, Kellogg said of 
the exchange of diplomatic notes that there was nothing in the 
notes from the states which effected any change to the Treaty. 
It was as if the Treaty itself had been laid on the table and 
signed with neither discussion nor demur. Yet, he maintained 
that the Treaty, as signed, included all of the understandings 
of the powers as expressed in the plethora of diplomatic 
Q 
correspondence that went with the Treaty to the Senate. 
Two common threads can be discerned in the replies. The 
absolute right of a state to decide for itself exactly what, 
if anything, self-defence means is referred to, for example, 
10 11 12 . 13 14 
by France, Poland, Great Britain, Australia, South Africa, 
1 C -If! 
Japan and the D.S.S.R.^" S e c o n d l y , the " p e n a l t y " f o r breach of 
the F a c t , i . e . the f o r f e i t u r e by a s t a t e of any of the 
b e n e f i t s a f f o r d e d by the T r e a t y , were s e t out i n d e t a i l in 
most of the r e p l i e s . An example i s the r e p l y of A u s t r a l i a ^ 
( through the Government of the Uni ted Kingdom): "If one 
s i g n a t o r y S t a t e r e s o r t s t o war i n v i o l a t i o n of the T r e a t y , the 
o t h e r S t a t e s are r e l e a s e d from t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s t o t h a t 
S t a t e . " 1 ^ 
K e l l o g g was w e l l aware of the e f f e c t of r e s e r v a t i o n s i n 
t r e a t i e s . He had p r e v i o u s l y addr e s s e d the Uni ted S t a t e s 
Senate on t h a t t o p i c , e x p l a i n i n g t h a t i t was 
" . . . w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t i n c a s e of ambigui ty or doubt i n 
t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of the terms of t h e t r e a t y r e f e r e n c e i s 
f r e q u e n t l y .made to t h e contemporary d e c l a r a t i o n s of t h e 
8. W.W. Willoughby 'Tne Sino-Janpanese Ccotroversy and the league of Nations (1935). 374 
9. L.H. Vfoolsey, 'The Fbrter & Ckpper ResolutiOTs against Traffic in Anns', (Editorial CcnnHit) 
(1929) 23 A.J.I.L.. 381 
10. D.P. Myers, Origin & (bnclusion of the faris Pact, (1929), 143 
11. Id. 146 12. Id- 1^ 7 13. Id. 149 14. Id. 151 
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negotiator who framed the treaties and to prior 
negotiations not to make a treaty where the parties have 
failed to do so nor to change the terms of the treaty 
actually made, but to determine the general object of the 
negotiations, the particular sense in which the terms 
otherwise uncertain of application, were used at the 
time, or the conditions as they existed at the time of 
the conclusion of the treaty." 
He submitted that a resolution of the United States Senate 
could interpret a treaty in such a way as to reserve American 
rights without destroying the effect of ratification in any 
20 way . "^ 
It is a well established rule of international law that,in the 
interpretation of treaties, the intent of the negotiators may 
be examined. Such intent ought normally to be found expressed 
in the treaty itself, but where, as in the case of the Pact of 
Paris, the document is both brief and contains within it no 
definitions of significant terms regard must, it is submitted, 
be had to the official correspondence of the negotiators and 
to the official utterances of such government spokesmen as Sir 
Austen Chamberlain, Foreign Minister Briand, Secretary of 
State Kellogg, and Senator Borah.''^ 
Bouchard differed from Kellogg. In his opinion, the 
reservations or interpretations, whatever they might be 
called, made or given by some of the States prior to the Pact 
being signed, amount to conditions. Noting that governments 
did not make declarations or reservations merely as idle 
gestures, he argued that they should be understood as 
constituting a frank and honest assessment of that 
17. The Treaty altered into force in Australia on 24 July 1929 by Instmnent of Ratification 
deposited by Australia on 2 ^feirch 1929. U.K.T.S. No. 29 of 1982 
18. C.C. Hyde, 'law in W^' (1942) 36 A.J.I.L.. 1949 
19. F.B. KeUogg, 'Speech to Uhited States Senate', (1919) Xm A.J.I.L., 770 
20. Id. 773 
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government's understanding of the obligations it was assuming. 
They therefore became an essential part of the treaty 
obligations as clearly as if they had been written into the 
22 
Treaty itself. 
Professor Shotwell, whilst not agreeing that the reservations 
or comments made by the concurring States form part of the 
Treaty, said that the way Kellogg had proceeded,allowed the 
idea to survive the danger of being lost in a welter of 
legalism which would obfuscate the purpose of a great reform 
by attempting to list, in detail, the conditions under which 
23 It was to operate. 
The U.S. Senate, in accepting the Pact of Paris, observed that 
it was acceding to it on the understanding that it did not, in 
any way, affect the rights of the United States to defend its 
territory or other vital interests in accordance with 
traditional American policies. It also noted that the Treaty 
in no way imposed any obligation on the U.S. to resort to 
coercive or punitive measures against any offending nation. 
Professor Shotwell was deeply concerned about the effect of 
the diplomatic notes exchanged prior to the Treaty being 
signed. In his view, if the contents of the exchange of notes 
were to be read as part of the Treaty, as he had agreed, then 
instead of a treaty for the renunciation of war and the 
outlawry of war, there would be substituted a solemn 
declaration that wars of self-defence, wars allowed for by the 
25 Covenant, and other wars allowed by the Pact are lawful. 
22. E. Bouchard, 'The Multi-lateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War' 
(1929) 23 A.J.I.L. 116 
23. J.T. Shotwell, What Germany Forgot. (1940) 196 
24. D.P. Myers, Origin & Conclusion of the Paris Pact. (1929), 65 
25. E. Bouchard, Op. Cit.. 118 
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CHAPTER 6 
A CONSIDERATION OF THE PACT OF PARIS 
6.1 The Preamble 
The preamble contains five separate sections. The first and 
last paragraphs indicate matters of intention. Paragraphs 2 
and 4 may be considered as statements of purpose. Paragraph 3 
deserves close attention. 
The weight that could be attributed to the preamble was not 
the subject of settled authority although English authority 
supported an argument that a preamble could, under some 
circumstances, be read as part of a covenant. The Australian 
note supported this proposition in that it expressly treated 
the preamble as being an operative portion of the Pact itself. 
The reference to changes being sought only by pacific means 
supports Article 1 in that a war which might be waged, whether 
for the solution of an international controversy or as an 
instrument of national policy may be a war which purported to 
effect a change in international relationships. 
The requirement that change must be the result of a peaceful 
and orderly process supports the provisions contained in the 
Articles. If a solution for a dispute involving a change in 
international relations were sought by other than pacific 
means, it would not be sought by a peaceful and orderly process. 
The Preamble describes the sanction which attaches to a treaty 
1. Great Northern Railway v. Harrison 12 C.B. 576 
2. D.P. Myers, Origin & Conclusion of the Paris Pact. (1929) 149 
3. F.N. Keene 'The Preamble to the Pact of Paris', Transaction of the Grotiu<? 
Society 1935. 1936. 178 . >-ne k^ rotius 
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signatory which goes to war in breach of the Treaty, namely, 
the belligerent state forfeits all benefit under the Treaty. 
Unfortunately the Treaty does not identify what those benefits 
might be. 
It could be tentatively argued that the benefits referred to 
in the Treaty are benefits which would flow in international 
law, which benefits would be denied to a state that acted in 
breach of the obligations of the Pact. Third states would 
have a right to go to war with an aggressor as they would not 
be obliged to remain neutral. A state cannot remain neutral 
and at the same time act inconsistently with the international 
law rules governing neutrality. An aggressor state would not 
forfeit the benefits of the laws of warfare by acting in 
breach of the Pact , although it is not clear whether such a 
result was intended by the Budapest Articles of 
Interpretation. Loss of benefit under the Pact, whatever that 
phrase might mean would not, in my view, amount to a loss of 
the benefits of international law. 
The meaning of this preamble, itself, is somewhat obscure. 
Keene has advanced two possible interpretations: 
(i) that the contractual principles of repudiation of a 
contract in municipal law are imported into 
international law. The phrase "should be denied" 
implies that other signatories not only have the right 
to deny, but are also under a duty to deny the benefits 
given by the treaty; 
(ii) that the advantage of immunity from war is limited to 
immunity from aggressive war only and does not extend 
to other warlike operations by way of defence against 
4. H. Lauterpacht, 'The Pact of Paris and the Budapest Articles of Interpret-
ation', Grotius Society. Volume XX (1935), 184 
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an aggressor. 
Keene rightly points out that, whilst it can be argued that 
signatory states can engage in warlike operations against a 
delinquent co-signatory to ensure that the Pact is enfor -
ced, argument could be said to lead to the strange result that 
the Pact would treat warlike operations for the enforcement of 
its provisions and obligations as if they were similar to 
warlike operations being conducted in breach of the Pact. In 
practice, the military engagements would, on the one hand, be 
defensive, and on the other, aggressive. 
If the second explanation offered is correct, then it means 
that the phrase "renunciation of war" in Article 1 applies 
only to aggressive and not to defensive war. 
6 .2 Renunciation of "War as an Instrument of National 
Policy" 
Are the words in Article I, "They condemn recourse to war for 
the solution of international controversies" simply indicative 
of a general desire for peace or do they have some further, 
promissory significance? Speaking on December 2, 1931, Briand 
claimed that League States were bound by the Covenant to 
resolve differences by pacific means. He added that this 
responsibility was reaffirmed in the Pact of Paris, whose 
signatories assumed or renewed the undertaking to resort to 
pacific means alone for the settlement of international 
disputes. 
The Pact prohibited war only as a means of "national policy". 
Accordingly, it could be faintly argued that, by implication, 
certain wars, e.g. wars fought as a matter of international 
policy or to attain a specific religious end,were permissible 
5. F.N. Keene, 'The Preamble to the Pact of Paris' Grotius Society (1935, 36) 
180 
6. Ibid. 
7. Q. Wright, 'When Does War Exist?' (1932) 26 A.J.I.L.. 368 
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wars. Dr Wehberg argued that if war was to be proscribed 
because some means superior to the use of military force 
existed to allow political ends to be realised, then war ought 
to be unequivocally renounced,without asking what the purpose 
o 
of the war might be. 
Shotwell dismissed criticisms that the Pact was vague or 
ambiguous , although he did assert that one of the effects of 
the Pact was to deny the legitimacy of war. He did not 
concern himself with the practical problems of what was to 
take the place of war in human affairs. It made no difference 
to him what the policy of a nation might be in any particular 
area. War was no longer able to be used as its instrument. 
In Bouchard's view, it was seriously open to question whether 
any national policy had been renounced by the Treaty or the 
cause of peace advanced. He felt that new causes of 
misunderstanding had been added to bedevil statesmen and 
politicians without there being any evidence of a compensatory 
9 gain to the cause of world peace. 
The Pact contains no intimation as to the mode by which 
international conflicts may be resolved in future. Apart from 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, there were three 
established bases for the resolution of disputes in 
international law. The parties could have had recourse to the 
concept of mediation as spelt out in the Hague Convention of 
1907 or Article 11 of the Covenant. Arbitration pursuant to 
Article 11 or 12 of the Covenant was available to League 
members for the resolution of disputes with other League 
members, provided that the dispute was a justifiable one, 
suitable for resolution by an arbitral court. Conciliation 
8. H. Wehberg, The Outlawry of War. (1931), 99 
9. E. Bouchard, 'The Multi-lateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War', 
(1929) 23 A.J.I.L.. 120; 'Monroe Doctrine in Arbitration Treaties, (1928) 
22 .-: A.J.I.L.. 362. 
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procedure was established by Articles 15 and 17 of the 
Covenant. The latter Article provided for a pacific means of 
resolving disputes as between League members and non-members. 
6.3 "By Pacific Means" - Article II 
Wright noted that the phrase "pacific means" is not the 
obverse of war in the legal sense: it is the obverse of 
"armed force" referred to in the Hague Convention of 1907. 
Somewhat presciently, Wolsley commented that if controversies 
were permitted to drag along unsettled or if nations were not 
able to maintain peace with justice and dignity under Article 
II, then the Pact of Paris would become "a scrap of paper and 
the reign of war will return." 
Writing in 1936, Professor Hudson asserted that Article II of 
the Pact imposed a legal obligation on States to refrain from 
settling any disputes by other than pacific means. The 
Article, as an instrument or source of public law, Vas not 
amenable to the detailed legal analysis to which it might be 
subject if it were a contract or a deed. He was not willing 
to concede that it was merely a pious hope,but treated it as a 
binding instrument having the compulsive force of 
international law. He asserted that it should be read 
together with the American treaties signed after 1928 relating 
to arbitration and conciliation, or to matters amenable to the 
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
By Article 36, that Court had jurisdiction, subject to certain 
important limitations, to hear and determine, as legal 
disputes, matters which fell into certain categories, 
including the interpretation of treaties, questions of 
10. L.H. Woolsey, 'The Porter & Capper Resolutions Against Traffic in Arms' 
(Editorial Comment), (1929) 23 A.J.I.L. 382 
11. See Articles 36 and 38 of the Charter of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. 
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international law, questions relating to breaches of 
international obligations and matters touching upon 
12 
reparations for breach of international obligations. There 
was no compulsory reference in the Charter except in respect 
of a state which ratified the optional clause. At the time of 
signing of the Pact only Germany, among the Great Powers, had 
signed and ratified that clause. 
After criticizing contemporary American attitudes towards the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and the League of 
Nations, Hudson noted that like most nations, the U.S. never 
considered itself a potential disturber of the peace, and yet 
when it came down to working out practical ways in which peace 
could be maintained, the U.S. engaged in long debates and took 
refuge behind traditional policies "handed down from the 
13 Napoleonic era". Page was of the opinion that Article II could 
be made more effective by devoting more attention to the 
codification of international law. "Peace in our time," he 
wrote, could be achieved although that goal was still distant 
and could only be realized if a series of high barriers could 
be surmounted. 
6.4 The Budapest Articles of Interpretation 
In September 1934 at Budapest, the International Law 
Association adopted, by a unanimous vote of the several 
hundred lawyers present, a document which became known as The 
Budapest Articles of Interpretation. That document was 
substantially based on a report prepared for the conference by 
an authoritative committee. The Articles were the consequence 
of the conviction of the meeting that the sixty-three States, 
all signatory to the Fact of Paris, had abolished the idea of 
12. D.P. Myers, Origin & CcnclusiCTi of the P^t of Paris. (1929), 24; K. I^e, The 
Rgiunciation of Wkr, (1929), 12 
13. M.O. ftidsCTi. By facific Means: The Implementatijtiof Article 2 of the fact of Paris 
(1936) 100 
14. K. fage. The Renunciation of W ^ , (1929) 26 
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war as a legitimate means of exercising pressure on another 
State in the pursuit of national policy. In the Association's 
opinion they also renounced any recourse to armed force for 
the solution of international disputes or conflicts; a threat 
to resort to armed force short of war would, if the threat was 
in respect of an international dispute, amount to a violation 
of the Pact. The conference conceded that, upon a breach of 
the Pact by an aggressor, other States were at liberty to do 
any of the following things: 
(a) Refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating 
the Pact of belligerent rights, such as visit and 
search, blockade etc.; 
(b) Decline to treat the State violating the Pact as a 
neutral State; 
(c) Supply the State attacked with financial or material 
assistance, including the munitions of war; 
(d) Assist with armed forces the State attacked.-'-' 
If the Pact were violated, then the violator was not to be 
given any de facto or de jure recognition of the territory or 
advantages acquired by reason of the violation. In addition, 
the violating State was to be liable to pay compensation for 
damages caused by a violation of the Pact to any signatory 
State or to its nationals. The resolution expressly preserved 
humanitarian obligations set out in the Hague Conventions, the 
Geneva Conventions and the Conventions relating to the 
treatment of Prisoners of War. 
The conference later passed two further resolutions on the 
Treaty, the first of which asserted that a violation of the 
Pact was a matter which concerned the interest of all 
15. Q. VMght, 'The Concept of Aggression in IntematiOTal Law', (1935) 29 A.J.I.L. 92 
16. H. lauterpacht, 'The Pact of faris and the Budapest Articles of Interpretatioi' 
Grotius Society. Vol. XX (1935), 178 
17. Q. Wright, Op. Cit. 93 
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signatory States, and thus should entitle each of them to 
insist that their separate interests be safeguarded in any 
subsequent Treaty of Peace. The second asserted that aid 
should be denied to any State which commenced or threatened to 
commence resort to armed force which refused or failed to 
submit the matter in dispute to either the Permanent Court of 
International Justice or to some other tribunal for final 
determination. ^° 
In its deliberations the Association seemed to pay no regard 
to the British, American, Russian or Japanese diplomatic 
notes, reservations or interpretations relating to the 
formulation and adoption of the Pact. The concept of 
legitimate war, it said, was obsolete and such ideas could not 
be allowed to dominate modern legal thinking. 
In February 193 5 Viscount Sankey, speaking in the House of 
Lords, observed that the 1934 Conference had been purely 
private and unofficial and that its members, in expressing 
their own views, did not necessarily represent either the 
opinions of lawyers in their own countries or the opinions of 
their governments. Commenting that it was possible to obtain 
agreement on its interpretation among a group of international 
lawyers, it did not follow that each of the governments 
concerned would be ready to accept all or any of the articles 
of interpretation adopted by the conf erence. •*•" 
He conceded that the Budapest Articles of Interpretation 
represented a contribution to the understanding of the meaning 
of the Treaty by the Community of Nations. However, although 
the suggestions are worthy of study, he emphasized that,in a 
final analysis, they amounted only to opinion. American 
18. Id. 95 
19. G.H. Ifeckworth, Digest of International law (Volung VH) (1943), 678 
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commentators took a similar view of the Articles. Hackworth 
wrote that while the suggestions merited study, they had no 
legislative force nor had they been adopted by any of the 
States who were parties to the Treaty. 
It is of significance to the development of international law 
and the law of aggressive war that the Budapest Articles 
contain no reference whatever to any possible sanction in the 
criminal area. They contemplate sanctions only in respect of 
the holding or withholding of recognition or the benefits of 
neutrality. At no stage was there any suggestion of criminal 
action against either individuals or states for violation of 
the Pact. 
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CHAPTER 7 
A CONSIDERATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE 
PACT OF PARIS 
7 .1 The Position of the U.S.A. 
One American view was that the effect of the Treaty was not a 
renunciation of war but a recognition of the legality of all 
wars mentioned in the reservations and exceptions. Arguably, 
it amounted to a recognition of the claim of Great Britain to 
be able to make war whenever its interests required it. It 
amounted to a commitment by the United States to the League of 
Nations without the benefit of a vote at League meetings. 
For Bouchard, an extraordinary feature of the Pact of Paris 
was the recognition given by the United States to the 
political arrangements effected in Europe by the Versailles 
Treaties of 1919. He defined the aggressor as being any state 
that forcibly effected a change in the status quo. By 
signing the Pact, the United States recognised the legality of 
'League' varsr and 'Locarno' wars. It could not avoid being 
bound by any League decision as to the identity of 
'aggressors' and yet not have a formal opportunity to take 
part in the deliberations which could lead to conclusions of 
3 
great import to the United States. 
Moore, cynically, saw the Pact of Paris as a device by which 
France could draw the United States into the affairs of the 
1. G.H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. IV (1942), 119 
2. For a treatment of the concept of a League War, see L. Oppenheim, 
International Law (4th ed. Vol. II) (1926) 133 
3. E. Bouchard, 'The Multi-lateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War' 
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League, thereby allowing France and her allies access to the 
significant military and economic power of the United States. 
If that was the intention of France, to some extent it was 
successful. In the face of opposition from Japan, the United 
States was invited to send a delegate to discuss with members 
of the League in formal assembly, matters relating to 
Manchuria. The United States'representative was authorised to 
participate and, in fact, did involve himself in the 
discussions of the Council when those discussions related to 
the possible application of the Pact of Paris." 
The Pact did promote the emergence of the United States from 
its previous policy of isolationism. In 1929 the United 
Kingdom Prime Minister MacDonald and President Hoover of the 
United States jointly announced, on behalf of their respective 
countries, that they agreed to accept the Pact of Paris not 
only as a declaration of their good intentions, but as a 
positive obligation to use the provisions of the Treaty as a 
basis for their respective national policies. 
In Shotwell's view the renunciation of war established a new 
basis for international law. Such a renunciation struck at 
what he called the anarchy of nations, which condoned wars of 
conquest and violence. He conceded that instruments of 
international justice were not yet established, and the Pact 
of Paris left this problem unresolved. He believed that in 
future, as war was no longer permitted, all disputes would be 
resolved by pacific means alone. He did not identify what 
those means might be, but thought that they would be developed 
over time. Neither was he concerned whether the new structure 
of international affairs was to be codified, treating that 
4. Dr S. Hishida, 'Comment on John Barrett Moore's Discussion with reference 
to Manchuria Incident, Embargo & Neutrality, "Aggression", Kellogg Pact, League. 
American Birthright etc' (1933) 34 
5. H.L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis. Recollection & Observations (1936) 62 
6. Id. 100 
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matter as speculative and not demanding an immediate solution. 
Writing in 1929 he observed, of the signing of the Pact, that 
the world that watched it saw it through different eyes and 
that reactions to the Pact ranged from denunciation of it as 
"hypocritical demagoguery to the enthusiastic endorsement of 
it as a realization of the supreme ideals of morals and 
religion ... [T]he great body of [American] public opinion 
rejected alike the cynic and the ultrapacifist, insisting upon 
the acceptance of the Pact but haunted by doubts as to Its 
effectiveness in a wicked world and not less troubled as to 
It 8 Its exact meaning. 
7 .2 The Doctrine of Non-recognition 
On 7 January 1932, theUnited States Secretary of State, Stimson, 
after noting the general obligations imposed by the Treaty, 
delivered himself of a note in which he enunciated the 
position of his Government on the problems in Manchuria. His 
Government felt that it owed a duty to the Governments of 
China and the Imperial Japanese Government to advise them that 
it would not recognise the legality of any de facto 
resolution, nor would it recognise any treaty or agreement 
made between those Governments, which could impinge in any way 
the Treaty rights of the United States. The note asserted 
that the United States had an interest in the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Republic of China under what was 
widely known as the "open door policy". Specifically, the 
United States would not recognise any arrangement which might, 
in its view, be entered into in breach of any of the 
obligations imposed by the Pact of Paris. 
7. J.T. Shotwell.War as an Instrument of National Policy and Its Renunciation 
In the Pact of Paris. (1929) (vi) 
8. Id. 3 
5 5 
This doctrine, which history had previously known as the 
Doctrine of Non-Recognition, became more widely known as the 
'Stimson Doctrine'. It was revived by Mr S. Levinson from a 
draft Convention of the Inter-American Conference of 1890.^ 
Writing on the concept of outlawry of war in 1921, he said, 
"All annexations, exactions or seizure by force, duress, or 
fraud shall be null and void." Levinson repeated the doctrine 
in similar terms in 1929 as an implied sanction which he 
thought arose out of the Pact of Paris. Wright, while 
denying that he was aware of the previous use of the phrase, 
in fact, spoke of such a doctrine being a logical result of 
the Pact of Paris in 193 0.-'^^ 
The Stimson Doctrine itself was not quite as wide as 
Levinson's views, in that it merely withheld recognition of an 
acquisition improperly gained, such recognition being in any 
event a discretionary right in the hands of recognising 
states. Had all the Treaty signatories taken the same view 
and expressed it publicly, there could have developed a new 
and useful addition to customary international 
law. 
Stimson wrote that he deliberately framed the warning in as 
wide a term as possible to come to the attention of States 
12 
other than those involved m the Manchurian dispute. He felt 
that a broadly based note could achieve the end of reinforcing 
the public perceptions of the Fact of Paris. 
Lauterpacht accepted that the Doctrine of Non-Recognition 
could logically follow from the Covenant, but disputed 
Stimson's argument that it could be extrapolated from an 
13 
outright renunciation of war. 
9. D.P. Myers, Origin & Conclusion of the Paris fact. (1929), 50. 
10. Q. Wright, 'The Meaning of the fact of Paris' (1933) 27 A.J.I.L. 50 
11. Ibid. 
12. H.L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis, Recollection & Observations, (1936) 94 
13. H. Lauterpacht, 'The fact of Paris and the Budapest Articles of Interpretation' Vol. XX 
(1935) Grotius Society. 184 
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7 .3 Neutral ity 
The Spanish view was unrealistic in that they asserted that 
the Pact had the important effect of abolishing neutrality. 
They confidently asserted that war had been effectively 
outlawed and consequently they could not see any purpose in 
continuing to study the laws of war. "We have killed 
neutrality. Why do we continue to study the laws applicable 
to neutrals?" 
Lauterpacht rejected that interpretation. He wrote that a 
guilty belligerent was entitled to expect that the other 
signatories of the treaty would, should they wish to remain 
neutral, be treated impartially. The Pact provides a starting 
point for important changes in the law of neutrality, but 
these changes must be effected by common action of the States 
themselves. They ought not to be effected byjurists engaged in 
drawing apparently logical consequences from the Pact. Thus, 
neutrality as a concept in international law,was unaffected by 
the Pact. 
7 .4 Outlawry of War 
Morrison, writing during the period of negotiations just prior 
to the Pact, noted that the concepts of outlawry of war and 
renunciation of war were not the same. He cautioned that war 
would not be completely outlawed until a genuine and adequate 
substitute for war had been established. He hoped that States 
would voluntarily agree to limit their national sovereignty so 
as to equip an international court with a code of what he 
described as the law of peace. Such a court would be granted 
jurisdiction over submitting States. 
14. G.H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law. Vol. VII, (1943) 672 
15. Id.. 678 
16. C.C. Morrison, The Outlawry of War. (1927) 294 
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Shotwell wrote, in 1936, that if one were to apply the 
yardsticks of diplomacy and international law then the treaty 
to outlaw war did not outlaw anything. It failed to ban any 
nation, including Japan after 1933, and banning was the 
hallmark of effective outlawry. 
7 .5 Self-Defence and Aggression 
Traditionally, a right of self-defence had been recognised in 
international law. In the Caroline case, the Governments of 
Great Britain and the United States accepted that a right of 
self-defence could arise when the emergency requiring self-
defence was instantaneous, overwhelming and left no choice of 
means and no time for deliberation. 
The British Government in 1919 noted that the Covenant 
explicity recognised that members must establish their own 
capacity for self-defence against any force that could be 
suddenly brought against them from an enemy and that it was a 
duty of the States to be able to bear and meet the first shock 
of sudden aggression. 
The controversy aroused by the self-defence exception in the 
Pact continued unabated for some years with some international 
law experts claiming that since self-defence remained legal, 
and each state having the right to interpret the Pact for 
itself, a belligerent could designate any war in which it 
became involved as a war of self-defence. Consequently the 
Pact could and would have no practical effect. This criticism 
was rejected by others who claimed that no state could 
unilaterally interpret a treaty in such a way as to free 
itself from contractual obligations. In the absence of a 
17. J.T. Shotwell, On the Rim of the Abyss. (1936), 125 
18. The Caroline case (1837), Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol 2 
at p.412 
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generally accepted definition of aggression, it became very 
difficult to resolve such a conflict of views.1° 
A close examination of the comments and/or reservations by 
States made prior to the Treaty being signed indicates that 
the right of self-defence was preserved, or perhaps more 
accurately , was not to be in any way affected by the Treaty. 
The right so preserved was a right variously described as 
legitimate defence, a sovereign right of defence, a natural 
right of legitimate defence, or simply as a right of 
legitimate defence. The United States Secretary of State 
Stimson, agreeing with his predecessor Kellogg, noted that 
such a right existed in domestic law as well as in 
international law and that its limits were clearly defined by 
20 
what he described as countless precedents. Stimson's speech 
was scathingly criticised by John Bassett Moore, who noted 
that students of the Pact of Paris,who sought to examine such 
countless precedents, were doomed to be disappointed as those 
precedents did not exist. He denigrated all attempts to 
21 define self-defence or aggression as being entirely futile. 
As the power to take action by way of self-defence was 
unaffected by the Covenant or the Pact of Paris, the real 
issue was whether, in the exercise of that power by a state, 
it was acting in comity with existing international law. 
Neither Kellogg nor Stimson suggested that the parameters 
of a right to self-defence could be decided exclusively by the 
state defending itself or claiming to be acting in self-
defence. That state must demonstrate its case in the 
international forum or stand condemned as a violator of the 
Pact. 
19. F.H. Hartmann, Basic Documents of International Relations, (1951) 115 
20. Q. Wright,'The Meaning of the Pact of Paris', (1933) 27 A.J.I.L.. 44 
21. Dr S. Hishida, Comment on John Barrett Moore's Discussion with reference 
to Manchuria Incident, Embargo SNeutrality, "Aggression", Kellogg Pact, Leaoue. 
American Birthright, etc. (1933), 30. » = . 
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The failure to define self-defence occasioned Shotwell some 
concern. Later he wrote that if the Treaty admits an 
exception of wars of defence, and substitutes no objective 
standard for deciding whether a claim is in any given instance 
justified or not, then the renunciation was and is largely 
22 
mef f ect ive . 
If each belligerent were free to determine whether a war it 
was waging was defensive or not, then a general principle 
became falsified in its application. If the right to go to 
war was simply renounced whereas the sovereign right of a 
nation to defend itself was left unaffected by the Pact, there 
should have been agreement among the signatory powers as to 
what constituted the right of defence. There was no such 
agreement. Shotwell foresaw that the same act of renunication 
might mean different things to different signatories in the 
23 hour of trial. He conceded that the problem of definition of 
aggression was an important one for the Treaty. In the 
absence of any definition it would be open for any country to 
argue that they were fighting a war of defence of either their 
land or territory in pursuing what they perceived as being the 
vital interests of their country. The aggressor should be 
identified by treating him as the power which, in going to war, 
violated one or more of its treaty obligations to settle its 
disputes peacefully. Breach of treaty obligations are 
themseelves sufficient to furnish an adequate test of 
aggression on the one hand and legitimate self-defence on the 
V 24 
other. 
S h o t w e l l ' s v iew on d e f e n s i v e wars was not shared by Dr Wehberg 
who wrote t h a t i f i t was i n t e n d e d to permit c e r t a i n wars such 
22. J .T . Shotwell, On the Rim of the Abyss, (1936), 107 
23. J .T . Shotwell , War as an Instrument of National Policy and I t s Renunc-
iat ion in the Pact of Par i s (1929) 58 
24. Id . 213 
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as defensive wars, then it would be better for such a 
principle to be clearly expressed in the convention. In his 
view it is only when the nations realise their obligations 
that they can be expected to comply with them, thus allowing a 
durable peace to be maintained. A Pact for the outlawry of 
war signed without reservations or with certain reservations 
tacitly admitted, would bind the parties no more securely than 
a treaty in which the same reservations were expressly 
stipulated. In addition,a treaty without reservation has a 
disadvantage of not presenting the true situation to people 
and of causing serious disappointments. ... [T]he progress of 
the [peace] movement will be better assured by a treaty, the 
limitations and gaps of which are more clearly discernible, 
25 than by a solemn declaration creating a false impression". 
That perceived omission in the Pact of Paris gave rise to 
international attempts to narrow the ambit of the gaps in the 
Treaty. In 1933 the U.S.S.R., by a convention open to 
accession by all other nations, attempted to define aggression 
by treaty. The recital of the Convention for the Definition 
of Aggression noted that the Pact of Paris prohibited all 
aggression and that,as parties to that Pact,the parties to the 
convention wished to define aggression specifically so as to 
avoid "any pretext whereby it might be justified." By Article 
II of the Convention, the parties declared that the aggressor 
in international conflict would be the State to first: 
(a) declare war on another state; 
(b) invade by its armed forces the territory of another 
state whether with or without a declaration of war; 
(c) institute or maintain a naval blockade of another 
25. H. Wehberg, The Outlawry of War. (1931), 75 
26. League of Nations Treaty Series. (Vol. CXLVIII) (1934), 213 
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State; 
(d) provide support to international insurgents of another 
27 
state. 
A perusal of the history of the relationships between the 
states who signed the Convention for the Definition of 
Aggression indicates that that Convention met with a similar 
fate to that of the Pact of Paris itself before 1939. There 
is no notable change in the foreign policy of the states 
concerned. Acts of aggression, including acts of war, still 
occurred right up to and including the events which led to 
World War II. 
7 .6 Recourse to War 
A clear example of the difficulties in interpreting the 
obligations imposed by the Pact of Paris arose in 1931 when, 
on September 19 1931, China complained to the Council of the 
League of aggression by Japanese troops. China invoked 
Article 11 of the Covenant and asked the Council to take the 
necessary measures to the status quo ante. 
No agreement had been reached among the member states as to 
what really amounted to war. The Covenant used the phrase 
'resort to war' and the Pact of Paris uses the almost 
identical words 'recourse to war'. Sir John Fisher-Williams 
had written that the meaning of the phrase 'resort to war' was 
the "unilateral, intentional action of a violent or forceable 
28 
character taken by one state against the other". Professor 
Brieley wrote that the phrase meant recourse to warlike acts 
whether those acts led to the legally different consequence of 
29 
a state of war. 
27. Id.. 215 
28. H. Lauterpacht. 'Resort to War and the Interpretation of the Covenant 
during the Manchurian Dispute', (1934) 28 A.J.I.L.. 46 
29. Ibid. 
62 
At the nub of the dispute between Japan and China before the 
Council was a disagreement about the level of hostilities that 
was required to constitute a state of war within the meaning 
that the Covenant ascribes to the word. 
A Commission was established to enquire into and report to the 
League chaired by the Earl of Lytton. The Commission duly 
presented its report which was adopted by the Assembly in 
April 1933 under Article 15 of the Covenant. The Commission, 
whose findings have been frequently cited as a justification 
for the attitude taken by some states to one of the 
belligerents, Japan, expressly deprecated its competency to 
decide complex matters of law. In particular, it declined to 
give any pronouncement of the meaning of the phrase "resort to 
war". Quite rightly It took the view that any opinion it 
might give on such a complex matter would be of no more value 
than the opinion of any group of laymen on a complex question 
of International law. 
Had the League determined there had been a resort to war by 
Japan, they would have been obliged to find that Japan had 
been In breach of the terms of the Covenant and therefore each 
of the League States would have been obliged to impose the 
30 
automatic and absolute sanctions envisaged by the Covenant. 
China had the option of accepting that a state of war existed, 
or maintaining that the aggression of which she complained was 
a use of force which did not amount to war in International 
law. China considered It in her interests to maintain the 
limited state of hostilities as they afforded her comparative 
security. Had she declared war or accepted the a state of war 
existed, the consequences of neutrality and rights and 
30. Id. 36 
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obligations which flow therefrom, would have had a significant 
and disastrous Impact on China. The League accepted that Japan 
had not resorted to war against China in the years 1931 to 
1933. 
Thus the Covenant proved to be illusory in a fundamental area. 
It did not succeed in protecting China from what China 
perceived to be external violence and aggression. Thus the 
prediction of the cynics who had long taken the view that the 
League itself would not be able to stand a challenge by one of 
the great powers was confirmed. The perceived defiance by 
Japan of its obligations under the Covenant and the Pact of 
Paris was unprecedented in its magnitude. Japan persisted in 
her view that at all times she was acting in accordance with 
the Pact of Paris by conduct amounting only to necessary self-
defence. This view was not accepted by the League. 
7 .7 Moral Force 
Shotwell wrote that the chief merit of the Pact was that it 
amounted to an assertion of international good faith. There 
was "no legal obligation in the Pact of Paris upon the United 
States or any other power to join in police action against a 
state which runs amok in the world and no external body is 
called upon to point out the duties of the signatories In case 
violation occurs ... The novelty in this method of approach 
1s that instead of enumerating the duties of the law abiding 
States, It denies the aggressor the right to calculate upon 
31 
the continuance of friendly relations." 
The force of public opinion was to be a moral force and would 
itself have a significant effect upon States. Somewhat 
31. J.T. Shotwell, War as an Instrument of National Policy and Its 
Renunciation In the Pact of Paris (1979^ Z21 ~~ ~ 
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naively he asserted that a state which breached the Pact would 
run the risk of seeing other countries unite against it and 
asked: "And where is the country, a signatory to this Pact, 
whose leaders would, on their own responsibility expose it to 
32 
such danger?" 
Other writers agreed with Shotwell's assessment of the 
importance of public opinion in the maintenance of peace. 
Public opinion, based on international morality, was asserted 
as being better insurance in the final analysis of world peace 
than military guarantees which were a two-edged sword and 
33 
could lead to the destruction of the League itself. 
Hackworth wrote that the efficacy of the Pact depended on 
nothing more substantial than the public opinion and 
conscience of the participating states who caused it to be 
A 34 
signed. 
Moore's comments are, in my view, the most telling even if 
they are irreverent. He did not seek to destroy whatever it 
was that the Pact of Paris achieved (although he could not 
identify any achievements) but when he was invited to accept 
that the promise to renounce war constituted some form of 
moral revolution more radical than the "commands of the 
Almighty and the precepts of the Church had been able to 
effect [he was] asked to exhibit a credulity beyond the 
.. 35 
capacity of common minds . 
Perhaps Shotwell was right when he said that a study of the 
history of civilization showed that war would only yield to a 
force stronger than itself and accordingly the Pact can only 
properly be judged by what, if anything, it actually 
accomplished. Unless it had some practical purpose, it really 
32. Id. 185 
33. H. Wehberg, The Problem of an International Court of Justice (1918), 89 
34. G.H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law (Vol. VII) (1943) 672 
35. Dr. S. Hishida, Op. Cit.. 35 
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had little value to the international community. 
7.8 Effects on State Sovereignty 
The traditional concepts of sovereignty were, according to 
Zimmern, effected by the Pact in that the Pact itself assumed 
that there existed some kind of world society whose members 
were least all agreed that war was an anti-social practice 
37 
which would not be permitted to continue. 
Dr Wehberg noted that the ratification of the Pact might have 
the startling consequence that, should a war of aggression 
take place in future, the citizens of those States which 
accepted the Treaty would have a right to refuse military 
service. Taking an extreme position, he argued that it would 
be not only their right but also their duty to do so because 
internationl law took precedence over municipal law and if 
international law made war a crime, the citizens of all states 
must abstain from participation in that crime. 
The phrase in Article I of war being renounced in the name of 
"their respective peoples" meant, in his view, that the people 
themselves are obliged to do what they can to see that the 
ends sought by the treaty are achieved and further that they 
were obliged to abstain from any act which might effect a 
30 
breach of the Treaty.-" 
36. J.T. Shotwell, Vlar as an Instrument of National Policy and Its Renunciation in the 
fact of faris. (1929) (viii) 
37. A. Zaimiem, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918-1935. (1936), 392 
38. H. Wehberg, The Outlawry of War. (1931), 84 
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CHAPTER 8 
RENUNCIATION OF WAR TREATY 
ITS PERCEIVED EFFECTS AT 1 SEPTEMBER 193 9 
The Pact provided no express sanction for any breach of its 
covenants or the obligations it imposed. It made lawful all 
wars except those expressly proscribed. It imposed no 
limitation on the extent to which, or the bases upon which, 
self-defence could be claimed as being the real cause of a 
conflict by a state that might otherwise be classified as the 
aggressor . 
The Pact was criticised by those who held the view that self-
defence was a term sufficiently flexible to permit any 
violence on the ground that it was solely a matter for the 
belligerents to interpret their own motives. It was 
criticised by those taking a strict view of the obligations 
imposed by the Pact who maintained that force used, even in 
defence, was unlawful as amounting to a breach of Article 2 in 
that a solution to a conflict, even by the victim, was being 
pursued by non-pacific means. 
The Pact, including the express declarations and reservations, 
applies to both Articles and sanctionsthe right of self-defence 
without providing any machinery for the regulation of that 
right. If the covenant was an attempt at world organization 
then the Pact was an attempt to secure peace without any 
organization. By prohibiting recourse to war, it failed to 
prohibit resort to force short of war. Had the prohibition in 
the Pact been against the use of force, such a prohibition 
would inevitably have embraced war. 
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Wars of self-defence, or permissible wars, included wars waged 
as a result of action taken by the League of Nations or action 
taken in response to a breach of the Locarno Treaty. It 
allowed wars to be waged and arguably made such wars lawful 
wars if they were waged in support of the Monroe doctrine as 
espoused by the U.S.A. or action xaken which the British 
Government could claim related only to matters which were 
reserved exclusively to His Majesty's Government in certain 
regions of the world. 
The Pact of Paris was weakened by the reservations. 
Interpretations or statements of policy set out in the various 
notes delivered between states in the period leading up to the 
signing of the treaty and the adhesion by subsequent states. 
The states failed to establish and maintain any form of 
international organization to police the Pact or to allow a 
forum to be established before which disputes that might 
otherwise lead to war could be referred for binding decision. 
The only express sanction for violation or breach of the Pact 
of Paris is as set out in the preamble, that is, a state might 
be denied the benefits afforded by the treaty. Such a 
sanction can only relate to what a state itself may be called 
upon to endure. In my view, the concepts of personal criminal 
responsibility was not one which had, as at 1 September 1939, 
either the force of custom or the force of international law. 
By 1935, 231 Special Treaties of Pacific Settlement had been 
executed and registered with the League of Nations; yet 
nothing substantial had been done to allow non-commercial 
issues of the very nature that tend to lead to war to be 
resolved by the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
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The Pact failed to affect the Impetus which developed during 
the 1930s towards the achieving of political ends other than 
through the means set out in the Pact and the Covenant. 
Aggression which was perceived to be successful in Manchuria 
and Abyssinia had failed because, in simple terms, the states 
Involved in aggressive conduct towards their neighbours either 
ignored It entirely or did not take it into account as a 
serious matter worthy of their consideration. Its perceived 
failure to prevent or restrain the waging of aggressive war 
lead to most, if not all, of the states considering it, at 
worst, a useless document and at best, as a set of moral 
guidelines to be followed when the circumstances were 
propit1ous. 
As Page wrote, "the traditions, customs, fears, hatreds, fixed 
habits and institutions cannot be dispelled overnight through 
the necromancy of words. .. 1 
In my view international law did not, as at 1 September 1939 
render a Head of State, Prime Minister or other senior 
government official acting within the domestic law of their 
states, subject to any form of criminal responsibility for any 
breach by their state of the Treaty. 
Briand, 1n his speech in Paris when the Pact was signed, 
looked forward to the morning when the nations would establish 
the machinery to enable the peace which had been proclaimed to 
be enforced. By 1 September 1939 that morning had not yet 
dawned. 
1. K. Page, The Renunciation of War, (1929), 20 
69 
ANNEXURE 1 
GENERAL TREATY FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR 
Paris, August 27, 1928 
The President of the German Reich, The President of the 
United States of America, His Majesty the King of The 
Belgians, the President of The French Republic, His Majesty 
the King of Great Britain, Ireland and The British Dominions 
Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Majesty the King of 
Italy, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the President of 
the Republic of Poland, the President of the Czechoslovak 
Republic, 
Deeply sensible in their solemn duty to promote the welfare 
of mankind ; 
Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation 
of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to 
the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now 
existing between their peoples may be perpetuated; 
Convinced that all changes in their relations with one 
another should be sought only by pacific means and be the 
result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any 
signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its 
national interests by resort to war should be denied the 
benefits furnished by this Treaty; 
Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other 
nations of the world will join in this humane endeavour and 
by adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into 
force being their peoples within the scope of its beneficent 
provisions, thus uniting the civilized nations of the world 
in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their 
national policy; 
Have decided to conclude a Treaty and for that purpose: 
ARTICLE I 
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names 
of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to 
war for the solution of international controversies, and 
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their 
relations with one another. 
ARTICLE II 
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or 
solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or 
of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, 
shall never be sought except by pacific means. 
ARTICLE III 
The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting 
Parties named in the Preamble in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements, and shall take 
effect as between them as soon as all their several 
instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at 
Washington. 
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It shall be the duty of the Government of the United States 
to furnish each Government named in the Preamble and every 
Government subsequently adhering to this Treaty with a 
certified copy of the Treaty and of every instrument of 
ratification or adherence. It shall also be the duty of the 
Government of the United States telegraphically to notify 
such Governments immediately upon the deposit with it of 
each instrument of ratification or adherence. 
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